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ABSTRACT 
Drawing on the existing literature on national saving and investment we 
attempt to identify and empirically analyze the main drivers of Greece’s 
current account position in recent decades and, especially, in the years 
following the euro adoption. Our results seem to provide broad-based support 
to the key findings of a number of earlier empirical studies on the 
determinants of Greece’s current account position. More specifically, the 
significant deterioration in the country’s current account position in recent 
years can be attributed to, among others: (i) accumulated loss of economic 
competitiveness against main trade-partner economies; (ii) pronounced fiscal 
policy relaxation following the euro adoption; (iii) the completion of domestic 
financial sector liberalization in the mid-90s and enhanced financial deepening 
post the country’s euro area entry. To assess the capacity of the new EU-IMF 
economic adjustment programme to stabilize Greece’s external position, we 
utilize our estimated econometric models to produce out-of-sample forecasts 
for the evolution of the current account in 2012-2016. Specifically, we 
examine a number of alternative scenarios encompassing varying degrees of 
policy-adjustment and success rates in implementing the agreed reforms. 
Assuming a broadly satisfactory pace of programme implementation, we 
forecast a steady improvement in the country’s current account position in 
the years ahead. This is deemed to be an important prerequisite for stabilizing 
and gradually starting to reduce Greece’s external debt, from what currently 
appear to be unsustainable levels.   
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Can Greece be saved? 





The present study draws on the existing literature on national saving and 
investment to identify and empirically analyze the main drivers of 
Greece’s current account position in recent decades and, especially, in 
the years following the euro adoption. Our results seem to provide 
broad-based support to the key findings of a number of earlier empirical 
studies on the determinants of Greece’s current account position. More 
specifically, the significant deterioration in the country’s current account 
position in recent years can be attributed to, among others, the 
following important factors:  
 Accumulated loss of economic competitiveness against main trade-
partner economies. This appears to have been the result of faster 
domestic inflation and unit labor costs (ULCs) growth relative to main 
trade-partner economies not being fully counterbalanced by 
respective productivity differentials.  
 Pronounced fiscal policy relaxation following the euro adoption. In 
line with the “twin deficit” hypothesis, wider fiscal deficits appear to 
have increased disposable incomes, boosting present consumption 
and reducing private saving. The aforementioned effects may have 
been even more pronounced in the initial years following Greece’s 
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euro area entry as domestic households probably perceived the initial 
rise in their disposable income as permanent.  
 Domestic financial deepening post the euro adoption. The completion 
of domestic financial sector liberalization in the mid-90s and 
enhanced financial deepening following the euro adoption appear to 
have been additional contributors to the deterioration in the 
country’s current account position. This has been the result of the 
ensuing relaxation of the intertemporal budget constraint facing 
domestic households and businesses.   
In an effort to reverse the aforementioned drivers and facilitate a steady 
improvement in the country’s external position, the new EU-IMF 
financing programme aims to recoup competitiveness losses 
accumulated since Greece’s euro entry and to enhance fiscal 
sustainability. A third strategic pillar of the new programme is the 
conservation of domestic financial stability. More specifically, the new 
programme envisions a further significant decline in the general 
government deficit (and a return to primary surpluses from 2013 
onwards) as a result of new austerity measures as well as the beneficial 
impact of a market-based restructuring of Greek public debt (PSI) and 
more favorable terms on the old and new EA/EFSF loans. The new EU-
IMF programme for Greece also puts special emphasis on structural 
reforms in the domestic labor and product markets, aiming to boost 
medium-term growth and to help reclaim accumulated competitiveness 
losses via a further significant decline in domestic ULCs and the 
liberalization of key sectors of domestic economic activity.  
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In this paper we attempt to assess the capacity of the new programme 
of fiscal consolidation and structural reforms to stabilize the country’s 
external position, focusing mainly on the factors described above. This is 
important given the ongoing heated debate about the programme’s 
effectiveness in addressing Greece’s long-standing structural economic 
problems. We estimate and discuss a number of alternative econometric 
specifications and then we use our baseline model to produce out-of-
sample forecasts for the evolution of Greece’s current account in 2012-
2016. We examine a number of alternative scenarios encompassing 
varying degrees of policy-adjustment and success rates in implementing 
the agreed reforms. Specifically, we forecast a steady improvement in 
Greece’s current account position in the years ahead. This is deemed to 
be an important prerequisite for stabilizing (and gradually starting to 
reduce) Greece’s external debt, from what currently appear to be 
unsustainable levels.   
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a 
brief literature review on the main determinants of the current account 
position; Section 3 takes an inter-temporal view on current account 
developments in Greece and the euro area; Section 4 presents the 
methodology and main results of our empirical study; Section 5 cross-
compares our results with earlier papers related to the Greek current 
account, presents our scenario and model-based projections and 
discusses their policy implications. Finally, Section 6 offers some 
concluding remarks. 
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2.  Theoretical overview and related literature 
Empirical studies on the determinants of the current account position 
typically focus on explanatory variables that potentially influence 
investment and saving decisions. Such variables usually include: (a) 
competitiveness indicators, such as the real exchange rate (REER); (b) 
catching up indicators, reflecting the state and speed of converge 
between countries with different income levels e.g. relative per capita 
income levels of the domestic economy and a reference foreign 
developed economy; (c) demographic factors, such as population growth 
and the old-age dependency ratio; (d) business-cycle indicators, such as 
the output gap; (e) degree of  financial market deregulation e.g. ratios 
such as private sector credit-to-GDP or M3-to-GDP may provide useful 
proxies for assessing the impact of banking intermediation on domestic 
private savings and the current account position; (f) the degree of 
integration with international goods, services and financial markets; in 
the case of Greece (and other economies in the euro area periphery), 
the creation of the Single European Market and, most crucially, the 
adoption of the common currency may have caused structural breaks in 
the current account time series as a result of e.g. the elimination of 
exchange rate risk as well as the collapse of domestic interest rates in 
the early EMU years; (g) fiscal variables, such as the general government 
balance; and (h) other  important variables, such as aggregate proxies of 
investor and consumer uncertainty (e.g. inflation volatility) and special 
factors having a temporary impact on the current account (e.g. deviation 
of oil prices and freight rates from their respective long-term averages).  
 
  5 
In what follows, we draw on the existing theoretical literature on 
external imbalances to provide some insight on the expected direction 
and potency of the effects of the aforementioned variables on the 
current account position. In Table 1 we summarize some the most 
important determinants of a country’s current account position and 
show the expected sign of the corresponding theoretical relationship in 
line with the existing literature.  
 Competitiveness indicators 
The real effective exchange rate (REER) is a typical competitiveness 
indicator utilized in empirical studies of the current account. The 
expected sign in the corresponding relationship is negative. That is 
because, on a ceteris paribus basis, an appreciation of the real exchange 
rate increases the purchasing power of domestic incomes in terms of 
imported goods. It also increases the relative value of financial, real 
estate and other assets held by domestic residents. These effects tend to 
reduce domestic saving and increase the propensity to consume. A REER 
appreciation of the domestic currency also tends to reduce the price 
competitiveness of a country’s exports in international markets. The 
aforementioned factors have probably even been amplified in the euro 
area following the introduction of the single currency as a result of 
strengthened competition. Recent empirical evidence suggests that the 
relationship between changes in the real exchange rate and the current 
account position may not be monotonic. Theoretical models allowing for 
such a non-monotonic relationship include, among others, Tornell and 
Lane (1998) and Mansoorian (1998). More recently, Arghyrou and 
Chortareas (2008) and Berger and Nitsch (2010) document that the real 
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exchange rate has a significant (negative) effect on the current account 
position in most euro area economies, thought the effect may be subject 
to nonlinearities.  
 Convergence indicators  
Convergence influences on a country’s current account position can be 
best conceptualized within the framework of the so-called inter-
temporal approach to the current account, originally proposed by Sachs 
(1981) and Buiter (1981) and later extended by Obstfeld and Rogoff 
(1995). More recently, Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002) applied a more 
elaborate intertemporal framework to the euro area to show that a 
country’s optimal level of external borrowing is higher, the greater is its 
expected output growth relative to the euro area average, the lower is 
the wedge between the domestic and the foreign interest rate and the 
higher the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods 
(see also Giavazzi and Spaventa, 2010).  
To a certain extent, these findings may provide some rationale to what 
some analysts and commentators have claimed to be a “benign neglect” 
attitude by EU authorities towards diverging current account positions 
across euro area member states, especially in the period before the 
outbreak of the global financial crisis. The basic idea here is that, in a 
monetary union characterized by increased market liberalization and 
financial integration, capital moves “downhill” i.e., from the more 
advanced, capital-intensive countries to less developed capital-scarce 
euro area states. This capital movement occurs in a quest of superior 
investment opportunities in poorer countries that are expected to enjoy 
stronger productivity and output growth in the future. Thus, the 
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catching up process between low and high per-capita-income countries 
in an environment of increased capital mobility may have a profound 
effect on these countries’ optimal external borrowing levels.  
Naturally, the above discussion gives rise to the notion that widened 
imbalances within the euro area may have both “good” and “bad” 
components (Eichengreen 2010). Countries like Greece and Portugal 
enjoying faster productivity growth in the early EMU years capitalized on 
the advent of the euro and deeper financial integration to attract foreign 
savings in order to finance domestic investments (Gourinchas 2002). This 
along with a concomitant increase in domestic consumption (i.e., 
reduced domestic saving) as a result of positive permanent income 
effects has given rise to widening current account deficits which, to a 
certain extent, were the natural outcome of the real convergence 
progress (Ahearne, Schmitz and von Hagen 2009). On the other hand, 
capital-abundant core euro area economies experienced the opposite 
effect. Namely, capital outflows were destined to higher growth areas in 
the euro area and this has arguably led to lower domestic investment, 
higher saving and persisting current account surpluses. Eichengreen 
(2010) extends the latter argument even further by claiming that core 
euro area countries like Germany and the Netherlands with their highly-
sophisticated banks were in a position to borrow from and run current 
account deficits with the rest of the world and on-lend to Greece, 
Portugal and other euro periphery countries. In that respect, in the early 
EMU years, the core was effectively acting as a financial intermediary 
between the periphery and the rest of the world.    
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Of course, the main rationale for characterizing certain external 
imbalances as “good” ones is based on the premise that converging 
economies starting from a low income-per-capital level will be 
eventually able to repay accumulated foreign liabilities by increased 
export revenues, once they reach a higher state of development. 
However, with the benefit of hindsight, one can now convincingly argue 
that growing bilateral imbalances within the euro area were, to a large 
extent, overlooked by authorities, at least in the initial EMU years. 
Unfortunately, this “benign neglect” attitude did not prevent certain 
“good” imbalances from turning into “bad”, driven by domestic 
distortions such as real estate and financial asset bubbles, fiscal 
profligacy and unrealistic expectations about future incomes. A number 
of recent empirical studies on the determinants of the current account 
position use relative per capital income levels as an explanatory variable 
for assessing and quantifying the impact of convergence effects. Based 
on the earlier discussion, one would expect the coefficient of that 
variable to be both positive and significant.    
 Financial integration 
The way in which financial integration affects a country’s current 
account position has been already discussed within the previous section. 
To recap, when countries become more closely integrated in goods and 
financial markets, a certain disconnect may arise between domestic 
saving and investment. This is because in a world characterized by 
capital mobility, capital moves “downhill” i.e., from the more advanced, 
capital-intensive countries to less developed, capital-scarce states. In 
turn, this suggests that poor countries with superior growth prospects 
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may see an increase in domestic investment, a decrease in domestic 
saving and, by implication, a higher current account deficit. Practically, 
the development of the single European market and the introduction of 
the common currency constitute natural experiments to empirically 
examine whether to what extent the formation of the euro area helped 
to eliminate the so-called Feldstein-Horioka Puzzle (see Feldstein and 
Horioka 1980).  
 Fiscal policy  
The potential effect of changes in fiscal policy stance on private saving 
and the current account depends on whether domestic households react 
in a Keynesian or a Ricardian fashion. In a Ricardian world, higher levels 
of public deficits and debts are, ceteris paribus, associated with higher 
domestic savings by households. In fact, the so-called Ricardian 
equivalence holds that an increase (decrease) in public debt must be 
fully offset by a rise (decline) in private saving. This offsetting dynamic is 
set in motion when, for instance, in response to a higher fiscal deficit (or 
lower fiscal surplus) domestic private agents decrease present 
consumption and increase precautionary saving in anticipation of 
reduced future disposable income. That is, as a result of higher expected 
taxation to repay public debt. Consequently, when the Ricardian 
equivalence holds, the impact of a fiscal policy change on the overall 
national saving (private and public) is zero and so is its impact on the 
current account position.  
A departure from the Ricardian equivalence may imply that an increase 
in public debt may not be fully offset by an increase in private saving. In 
particular, the Keynesian model suggests that a higher fiscal deficit (or 
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lower fiscal surplus) as a result of higher government spending or lower 
taxation increases disposable income and thus, boosts present 
consumption and reduces private saving. The aforementioned effect is 
even more pronounced if “myopic” households perceive the rise in 
disposable income to be permanent. This behavior of private agents in 
the Keynesian model gives rise to the so-called twin-deficits hypothesis, 
which states that higher fiscal deficits should be usually accompanied by 
wider current account deficits and vice versa.   
 Financial liberalization  
A potentially important driver of the current account position that 
frequently appears in the empirical literature is financial liberalization as 
proxied by e.g. the ratio of private sector credit-to-GDP. Conceivably, 
financial liberalization and financial deepening are often associated with 
lower private saving, thanks to the relaxation of the intertemporal 
budget constraint facing households. Moreover, to the extent that these 
factors also facilitate significant price increases in domestic asset 
markets (e.g. housing), increased financial liberalization and bank 
intermediation may lead to lower private saving and higher consumption 
as a result of permanent income effects (Brissimis, et al 2010).  
 Real interest rate  
 The real interest rate - as proxied by e.g. the average deposit rate minus 
CPI inflation - can potentially influence private saving through two 
opposite channels; namely, a substitution effect and an income effect. A 
rise in the real interest rate can conceivably increase private savings as 
households postpone consumption and save more today in order to 
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facilitate higher consumption in the future. A higher real interest rate 
also increases the opportunity cost of investments. On the contrary, if 
the income effect prevails over the substitution effect, then a rise in the 
real interest rate on deposits may induce higher consumption (and less 
saving) today.   
 Demographic factors  
Theoretical models and recent empirical studies document that 
population growth and the population age structure may have a 
significant effect on the behavior of private saving.  The latter may be 
negatively affected by a high dependency rate or old population ratio. 
The basic intuition here follows from the life-cycle theory of 
consumption which implies that higher income and savings in mid-age 
working life offset dissaving in young and old ages. Arguably, that is 
because dependent and elderly people consume more than they 
produce and depend on the provision of goods by productive members 
of the economy (Higgins 1998; Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2002). The above 
arguments imply that a high contemporaneous share of dependents 
relative to workers tends to have a negative effect on the current 
account balance. On the contrary, some empirical studies have 
documented a positive relationship between the current account 
balance and the future dependency ratio. That is on the basis that the 
latter variable constitutes a proxy of the amount of aggregate saving 
that domestic households need to undertake today in order to sustain 
living standards in the future (see e.g. Barnes, Lawson and Radziwill 
2010).  
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The potential influence of the demographic structure of an economy on 
domestic investment may be less straightforward. If capital and labour 
are complements in production, as it especially holds for business 
investment, a reduction in the growth of working-age population may 
have a negative effect on domestic investment (and vice versa). The 
opposite may also be true for the young and old population (Hoffmann 
2002).  However, in the case of public investment, a high dependency 
and old population ratio may raise the need for increased investment in 
social infrastructure.   
 Macroeconomic uncertainty  
Macroeconomic uncertainty (as proxied by e.g. inflation volatility) may 
have a significant effect on domestic saving behavior. The prevailing 
view in the literature is that in periods of increased macroeconomic 
uncertainty, domestic private-sector agents reduce present consumption 
and increase precautionary saving so as to smooth their consumption 
streams in the face of volatile future income flows. Yet, some existing 
empirical evidence suggest that the effect of high inflation volatility may 
in fact work in the opposite direction i.e., reduce saving and increase 
current consumption at the expense of future consumption (see e.g. 
Brissimis et al 2010).   
 Cyclical variables  
Higher domestic GDP growth is often associated with lower current 
account balances, though this result has not proven to be very robust 
across countries. The basic idea here is that higher contemporaneous 
GDP growth rates may induce higher consumption (and lower saving) 
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today, especially if households expect higher future income levels. 
Higher growth rates resulting from productivity gains may also lead to 
higher domestic investment (Barnes, Lawson and Radziwill 2010).    
 Trade openness  
Trade openness - proxied by the ratio of the total value of external trade 
(exports plus imports) to GDP - is used in many empirical studies as an 
indicator of the existence of barriers to trade and the degree to which a 
country is an attractive destination for foreign capital inflows. The 
existing empirical literature broadly supports a positive link between 
trade openness and the current account balance.   
 World oil prices  
Higher world oil prices exacerbate widening pressures on the current 
account deficit of oil-importing countries and vice versa. Greece in 
particular is one of the most energy-dependent economies in the euro 
area and thus, one would normally expect widening pressures in its 
current account deficit in periods of price appreciation trends in world 
oil markets. Transportation revenue, primarily from shipping, also 
constitutes an important component of the Greek services balance. As 
such, periods of large deviations in world oil prices and freight rates 
from their historical averages must have had a significant effect on the 
country’s current account position. 
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3. Drivers of current account developments in Greece and the 
euro area 
Historically, Greece and other economies in the euro area have been 
running significant current account imbalances (see Figure 1). However, 
the scale and persistence of such imbalances in the period following the 
introduction of the euro in 1999 appears to have been greater than in 
earlier decades (Barnes, Lawson and Radziwill 2010). In particular, for 
the period leading to the global financial crisis in 2008, the increase in 
dispersion in current account positions among OECD countries was 
greatest for the European Union, especially euro area countries 
(Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2002). The turn of the year 2008 found most 
countries in the so-called euro area periphery running large current 
account deficits (Greece: -17.9%; Portugal: -12.6%; Spain: -9.6% - AMECO 
database; all figures expressed as percentage of GDP), with core 
member states in the richer north featuring significant external 
surpluses (Germany: +6.2%; the Netherlands: +4.7% ; Finland: +3.2%). 
Despite these large current account imbalances across member states, 
the overall current account position of the euro area in 2008 was close 
to balance (-0.7% of GDP). 
The scale of current account imbalances (and the ensuing net foreign 
asset and liability positions) across euro area countries in the period 
following the introduction of the single currency has raised concerns as 
to whether such large and unprecedented positions could be justified on 
the basis of underlying macro fundamentals (Arghyrou and Chortareas 
2006). As we have already alluded to in the previous chapter of this 
paper, current account imbalances constitute an important mechanism 
for open economies to smooth consumption (Barnes, Lawson and 
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Radziwill 2010). That is at least the prevailing view in the new open 
economy macroeconomics literature and, especially, of the 
intertemporal approach to the current account positions (Buiter 2001, 
Sachs 2001, Obstfeld and Rogoff 1995). The implications of the latter 
view for the euro area is that diverging current account positions across 
member states potentially constitute the natural outcome of 
strengthened domestic financial deepening, the removal of exchange 
rate risk and the integration of goods, services and financial markets as a 
result of the single European market and the creation of the EMU. While 
the intertemporal budget constraint implies that countries cannot 
continue to increase their net indebtedness forever, foreign borrowing 
to finance productive investment and to smooth consumption may be 
sustainable for some time. Furthermore, for mature economies with 
aging populations, accumulation of foreign assets maybe an effective 
way to fund future consumption (Barnes, Lawson and Radziwill 2010). 
Greece’s current account position underwent a sizeable deterioration in 
the initial years following the country’s euro area entry in 2001. 
According to Bank of Greece’s balance of payments (BoP) statistics, the 
current account gap widened from levels around €10.6bn (7.8%-of-GDP) 
in 2000 to a record €34.8bn (14.9%-of-GDP) in 2008, before embarking 
on a declining path, reaching ca 21.1bn or 9.8%-of-projected GDP at the 
end of 2011 (Figure 1). Earlier studies have empirically documented a 
number of underlying factors driving the widening in the country’s 
current account deficit particularly in the period 1999-2008 (see e.g. 
Bitzis, Paleologos, Papazoglou 2008). To recap, some of the most 
important drivers of the deterioration in the current account position 
(and the ensuing accumulation of net foreign liabilities) include: 
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A gradual loss of competitiveness as a result of higher domestic 
inflation and relative unit labor costs vis-à-vis main trade-partners. The 
real effective exchange rate (REER) constitutes a natural aggregate proxy 
of competitiveness and Greece’s competitiveness deteriorated 
significantly since the country adopted the euro (Figure 2). Note that 
participation in the common currency area eliminates the possibility of 
reclaiming competitiveness losses via a depreciation of the nominal 
exchange rate. Effectively then, the only available root through which 
competitiveness can be restored is via an internal devaluation 
programme to compress the general level of domestic wages and prices. 
In fact, internal devaluation constituted one of the three main strategic 
pillars of both the 1
st
 and the 2
nd
 EU-IMF bailout programmes for Greece 
(initiated May 2010 and March 2012, respectively), with the other two 
being fiscal stabilization and the safeguarding of domestic financial 
system stability.    
Higher GDP growth, mainly driven by domestic demand, in the initial 
years following the adoption of the common currency. Greece’s real 
GDP growth averaged 3.8% in the period 2001-2008 vs. 2.4% in 1991-
2000 and 0.7% in 1980-1990. This was the result of, among others, the 
domestic financial liberalization that took place by the mid-90’s and the 
collapse in interest rates that followed the adoption of the single 
currency. Special factors, including increased fixed investment ahead of 
the 2004 Olympic Games, raised the import content of domestic 
demand, aggravating the ensuing deterioration of the country’s current 
account position. The cyclical position of the Greek economy relative to 
other euro area economies over that period helped to reinforce the 
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aforementioned trends. In the period 2001-2008, the average annual 
output gap of Greece was ca +0.9% compared with a corresponding 
average of -0.01% in Germany (AMECO data).  
The sharp rise in public deficits and debts after Greece joined the single 
currency area. Using a typical Keynesian argument (twin deficit 
hypothesis), the sharp decline in public savings in the years following the 
euro adoption may have aggravated the deterioration in the country’s 
external imbalance.  
Factors exogenous to developments in the Greek economy, e.g. 
developments in world oil and freight prices, may have also affected 
considerably the country’s current account position in recent years. 
Greece is a net oil importer and its economy is energy intensive. 
Moreover, transportation revenue from shipping has traditionally been a 
major source of financing for the services balance, given the country’s 
strong share in the global commercial fleet. As a result, the sharp rise in 
the levels and volatility of international oil prices since 2005-2006 has 
aggravated pressures on the current account deficit. Moreover, the 
strong increase in shipping revenues mid-last decade exerted a positive 
influence on the current account balance.  
Figure 3 provides a more inter-temporal view of Greece’s current 
account position. The graph depicts the current account balance 
expressed as the difference between national saving and investment. In 
the period before Greece’s euro area entry (2001), the country’s current 
account position recorded mostly small-to-medium sized deficits 
(between 2% to 5%-of-GDP). Over that period national saving and 
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investment evolved broadly in sync, with the latter mostly exceeding the 
former. This reflected, among other factors, increased inflows of EU 
cohesion funds and, more generally, the fact that in a world of increasing 
financial integration capital moves from the more advanced, capital-
intensive countries to less developed, capital-scarce states.  
However, in the period following the domestic financial liberalization in 
the mid-90s and, and especially, after the adoption of the euro, a 
significant deterioration in Greece’s current account position occurred, 
with the corresponding shortfall reaching unprecedented levels. As 
depicted in Figure 3, the widening of the current account deficit in the 
period 2001-2008 was mostly the result of declining national (private 
and public) savings, especially during the second half of that period. On 
its part, total investment (as percent of GDP) hit a multi-year high near 
25% in 2003 (the year before the 2004 Olympic Games) to only decline 
steadily thereafter, with the descent taking accelerating proportions 
after the eruption of the global financial crisis in 2007/08.  
A breakdown of the national saving and investment series in their 
respective public- and private-sector components in the period following 
the outbreak of the global financial crisis reveals some interesting trends 
(see Table 2). Starting with the private saving-investment (S-I) balance, 
what is probably the most striking development is the collapse in private 
investment following the eruption of the global financial crisis and, more 
recently, the outbreak of the Greek sovereign debt crisis (late 2009).  In 
an effort to rescue Greece from an outright default -given the explosion 
of Greek sovereign bond yield spreads to prohibitively high levels during 
the first months of 2010 - its euro area partners and the IMF agreed on a 
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sizeable lending package (~€109bn), aiming to cover a significant part of 
the country’s borrowing requirement until end -2012/mid-2013.  
 
4. Empirical analysis on the determinants of Greece’s current 
account position 
4.1. Data and notation 
Broadly in line with the literature review presented in the previous 
section, we consider annual data on Greece’s current account, expressed 
as percent of GDP, as well as a range of potential explanatory variables. 
The primary source of our data is the European Commission’s AMECO 
database and the estimation time period, when available, is 1960-2011. 
Table 3 provides a summary of our data and the notation utilized in what 
follows. 
 
4.2. Empirical methodology 
It is not straightforward to select an appropriate methodology given the 
very limited time span of the available data. On the one hand, one 
wishes to perform an equilibrium or long-term analysis, since Greece’s 
structural problems do not only necessitate short-run adjustment but 
they also require a shift towards a new equilibrium position. On the 
other hand, identifying the type of trend(s) in the data is difficult given 
the relatively short sample. This is true irrespective of the estimation 
method that one wishes to use. With this important caveat in mind we 
proceeded to formulated vector error correction models (VECM), using 
the standard methodology and focusing on specification testing after 
estimation. The VECM approach is practically useful as it offers a 
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coherent framework for generating short-run adjustment estimates, 
long-run equilibrium estimates and policy-related forecasts. The 
estimation, testing and specification methodology is well known and 
follows Johansen’s contributions (1991, 1995). Preliminary results on 
unit root tests point to the presence of stochastic trends for all variables 
under study and are available upon request.   
The elaborate, consider first the national accounts identity, according to 
which the current account, ca, is equal to the difference between 
national saving (S) and investment (I).  
CA = S - I = (SP– IP) + (SG – IG)        (1)  
where we have, SP and IP, to denote private saving and investment;  SG 
and IG, denote public saving and investment; with all variables 
expressed as a percentage of GDP.  
Expressing then SP as a function of private saving determinants, 
equation (1) becomes: 
CA = f (REER, private credit -to-GDP, SG – IG, IP, rear GDP per capita, 
output gap, old-age dependency ratio, terms of trade, trade openness, 
…..)  – IP + (SG – IG)        (2) 
Or, using n the notation in Table 3, we rewrite equation (2) as:                                                             
ca = f(rer, credit, SG–IG, IP, ypcgr, oadr, tot, open,...) – IP + (SG – IG) (3) 
Converting to a linear representation, representing a long-run 
relationship among these variables, we have: 
cat = b0 + b1rert + b2creditt + b3ypcgrt +…+ bn-1IPt + bnggvntt + εt (4)                                                                  
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where the variable ggvnt (general government deficit as percent of GDP) 
is used as a proxy for the variable SG – IG in equation (3). Equation (4) is 
to be estimated, using various VECM specifications, as the long-run 
cointegrating relationship of these variables. The detailed results on 
cointegration testing are available on request. In the next section we 
present the results from the estimation and specification testing of 
various models, all of which include information about the presence of 
cointegration. In all the VECM specifications we have also used two 
dummy variables; one for the introduction of the euro (starting in 1999) 
and another for the onset of the crisis (starting in 2008). 
 
4.3. Estimation results and discussion 
Table 4 provides a comprehensive summary of all estimated VECM 
models. The first (upper) part of the table presents the estimated 
coefficients (and associated t-statistic values in parentheses) of the 
cointegrating vector and also of the VECM error correction term (the 
speed of adjustment). The second (lower) part of the table presents all 
relevant specification statistics. These include: tests for cointegration, 
lags used, all standard diagnostics on residuals, model fit, stability 
analysis of the cointegrating relationship and Granger causality on the 
short-run dynamics. The long-run significance is measured by the 
significance of the speed of adjustment coefficient.  
  For illustration we present below the estimated equilibrium 
relationship for Model 1, which we use as our baseline model as it 
contains the most-relevant policy variables. In this model the current 
account is linked with the fiscal deficit, the real exchange rate and 
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private investment. The model produces significant estimates of the 
cointegrating relationship and it passes all diagnostic tests. Furthermore, 
there is a strong effect both on the long-term relationship (significant 
speed of adjustment estimate) and on the short-run dynamics 
(significant Granger causality test). We have: 
cat = 2.53 + 0.95ggvntt – 0.52rer15,t -0.78pinvt + εt     (5) 
Note that in the above equation all estimates have the (theoretically) 
correct sign (see again Table 1). Specifically, the estimate of the real 
effective exchange rate, rer15,t, is negative and strongly significant. 
Earlier we discussed the theoretical rationale for the negative sign of this 
important indicator for price-competitiveness. To recap, the idea is that 
an appreciation of the real exchange rate increases the purchasing 
power of domestic incomes in terms of imported goods. It also increases 
the relative value of financial, real estate and other assets held by 
domestic residents. These effects tend to reduce domestic saving and 
increase the propensity to consume. A real effective appreciation of the 
domestic currency also tends to reduce the price competitiveness of a 
country’s exports in international markets. Note at this juncture that the 
coefficients of the real effective exchange rate variables in all alternative 
VECM model specifications are all negative and statistically significant.   
Next, note that the estimate on the impact of private investment is also 
negative and significant. Indeed, this was to be expected from the 
national accounting identity expressing the current account as the 
difference between national saving and investment - see again equation 
(1).  
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Turning now to the estimate on the impact of the fiscal balance we see 
that it is positive and significant. This positive relationship provides 
support to the so-called twin deficit hypothesis and appears to be in 
broad agreement with the evolution of Greece’s current account and 
fiscal positions, especially in the years following the country’s euro area 
entry. These also point to a type of behavior by domestic agents that is 
broadly in line with the main predictions of the Keynesian model, which 
claims that a higher fiscal deficit (or lower fiscal surplus) tends to 
increase disposable income and thus, to boost present consumption, 
reduce private saving and lead to a wider current account deficit. The 
aforementioned effects are even more pronounced if “myopic” 
households perceive the rise in disposable income to be permanent. 
Note that in some of our VECM specifications (Models 6-10) the 
estimates of the fiscal balance turn negative, implying a partial 
Richardian type of behavior by domestic households. However, in most 
of these models the estimates of the general government balance were 
found to be insignificant. Finally, note that in a number of estimated 
specifications we cannot reject the hypothesis that the effects of the real 
exchange rate and the fiscal balance are of the same magnitude but 
opposite sign. Specifically, the test for this long-run restriction in Model 
1 has a p-value of 0.64. It appears that with this model and the data at 
hand there is evidence about the joint, and possibly equal, importance 
of the real exchange rate and the fiscal balance for restoring the current 
account equilibrium in Greece.   
In Model 1, as well as in all other estimated specifications, we utilize two 
dummy variables, labeled eurodummy (d99) and crisisdummy (d2008). 
As indicated earlier, the former takes the value of 1 in the years 1999 
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onwards and zero (0) otherwise. The latter, takes the value of 1 in the 
years 2008 onwards and the value of 0 in all other years. The first 
dummy aims to empirically document whether and to what extent 
domestic financial deepening and increased financial integration with 
world goods and capital markets as a result of euro area entry have led 
to a trend deterioration of Greece’s current account position in the 
initial years following the adoption of the single currency. In all of the 
VECM specifications utilized in our study, the estimates have the 
theoretically-correct sign (negative) and are also significant. The second 
dummy variable aims to capture the impact of the 2008/09 global 
financial crisis and, primarily, the effects of the ensuing Greek sovereign 
debt crisis on the country’s current account position. As we have noted 
already, a notable improvement in Greece’s current account deficit is 
evident since 2009, mainly as a result of a sharp contraction of imports 
due to the domestic economic recession and the gradual reversal of the 
significant real effective rate overvaluation accumulated since the 
country’s euro area entry in 2001. Again, all estimates for this variable 
have the theoretically-correct (positive) sign and they are also 
statistically significant.    
All in all, the results of our baseline model (Model 1) appear consistent 
with both the theoretical literature and our general consideration 
regarding the drivers of Greece’s current account position. Since the 
model appears to be correctly specified we will be using it for the 
generation of out-of-sample forecasts going up to 2016. 
Turning next to the rest of the VECM specifications and the other 
explanatory variables in our study, we find that their estimates are 
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overall significant and they have the signs predicted by the theory. We 
discuss them below. 
The estimates of our credit variable are all negative and strongly 
significant. Our private credit-to-GDP variable is used in our empirical 
study as a proxy for financial deepening and financial liberalization. In 
theory, higher levels of financial deepening are often associated with 
lower private saving, thanks to the relaxation of the intertemporal 
budget constraint facing households. Moreover, to the extent that this 
effect has also facilitated significant price increases in domestic asset 
markets (e.g. housing), increased domestic financial liberalization and 
bank intermediation may have led to lower private saving and higher 
consumption as a result of permanent income effects (see also Brissimis, 
et al 2010).  
The estimated coefficients of our tot variable are positive, yet 
insignificant in the models that they appear (models 2, 7 & 8). In the 
international economics literature, “Terms of Trade” is defined as the 
ratio of price exports to price imports. It effectively measures what 
quantity of imports can be purchased through the sale of a fixed 
quantity of exports. A terms-of-trade improvement is usually considered 
to be good for a country in the sense that it can buy more imports for 
any given level of exports. 
The estimated coefficients of our open variable are negative and mostly 
significant. The negative sign of the estimates of our trade openness 
variable appears to be in disagreement with what the theory predicts 
(see Table A1). We interpret this finding as follows: Greece’s imports of 
goods and services have traditionally been much higher than its exports 
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of goods and services in value terms. (In 2011, the total value of imports 
was 2.4 times higher than the corresponding value of exports). Given 
then that our trade openness indicator is calculated as the ratio of the 
total value of imports and exports to nominal GDP, for most of the 
sample a rise in our open variable primarily indicates an increase in the 
total value of imports (relative to the total value of exports), which, in 
turn, points to a wider current account deficit, so that the negative sign 
can be consistent with the Greek experience.   
Finally, the estimated coefficients of our ypcgr (logarithm of Greek 
output per capita GDP) and rygrnl (real GDP per capita of Greece relative 
to real GDP per capita of a reference country – here Netherlands) 
variables are found to be negative and significant in VECM models 2 & 5, 
while they are positive and insignificant in models 3 & 10. This finding is 
interpretable but it is not clear whether this interpretation is structural 
or it just relates the historical path of these variables along with the 
current account (the current account was worsening as the standard of 
living was rising). The structural explanation, however, could be 
consistent with the necessity of a fiscal improvement and a rise in 
competitiveness – at least during the short-run adjustment period. 
Before closing this section we note that all estimates of the speed of 
adjustment have the correct sign (negative) and are all statistically 
significant (with the exception of Model 3). These estimates roughly 
measure the average correction back to equilibrium that one expects to 
occur within one period (i.e. within one year in our context). For 
example, in Model 1 the estimate is -0.44 which implies that around 44% 
of the current account disequilibrium is anticipated to be corrected, on 
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average, within one year. Therefore, our baseline model implies that it 
would take more than 2 years for a complete return to the estimated 
long-run equilibrium. From a structural interpretability standpoint, the 
magnitude of this estimate is an additional factor encouraging us to use 
Model 1 for generating forecasts for Greece’s current account position. 
Note that the rest of our estimated models imply an even faster 
adjustment, which appears unrealistic given past experience and the 
current situation of the Greek economy. 
 
5. Comparison with earlier papers, discussion of policy 
implications and projections for the current account deficit 
Our estimation results presented in the previous section are in broad 
agreement with the literature related to the evolution of Greece’s 
current account position, as presented in e.g. Arghyrou and Chortareas 
(2008), Bitzis et al. (2008) and Brissimis et al. (2010). The first of these 
papers, Arghyrou and Chortareas (2008), places special emphasis on the 
role of real exchange rates as determinants of the current account and 
explores their importance in a European and not just a Greek context. 
They also use a VECM approach where the current account enters the 
specification along the real exchange rate and domestic and foreign 
output levels but their sample is restricted from 1978 to 2005 and they 
do not consider other explanatory variables in their analysis. They also 
consider whether the current account adjustment can be non-linear, 
although the small sample available for Greece (as the authors note) 
makes the results rather difficult to interpret. In the second of the 
aforementioned papers, Bitzis et al. (2008), the authors consider only 
one VECM specification that includes both fiscal and competitiveness 
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variables but they use quarterly data from 1995 to 2006 in their analysis. 
They find, however, 3 cointegrating vectors in their estimation results 
and their estimated signs do not always coincide with our own estimates 
– although their empirical conclusions support the current arguments.  
In the latest paper of Brissimis et al. (2010), the authors perform a long-
run equilibrium analysis with emphasis on stability and consider the 
financial liberalization and credit expansion as a main driver of the 
deterioration in the current account deficit. Their methodology is 
different from both ours and the other two papers mentioned before, as 
they use a single equation approach. However, they do use, as their 
main specification, a model that contains the same variables as our 
baseline model and we have agreement in the signs and significance of 
the corresponding estimates. Their sample covers about the same period 
as the one we use here; it starts in 1960 and ends in 2007, compared to 
2011 in our study. The authors perform a current account stabilization 
exercise, which is, however, not a direct projection on the current 
account path. Using their estimates and making assumptions about the 
path of the nominal growth rate, inflation, private investment and 
income per capita for Greece, they find that the current account will fall 
to 4.7% of GDP in 2015 – in line with our speed of adjustment estimate 
of a two year period gap before returning to equilibrium that we 
presented in the end of the previous section. In the next section we 
perform model and scenario-based projections that show that this 
number of 4.7% is among the plausible values for the future current 
account. 
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Summarizing so far, we can see that our econometric results appear to 
provide broad-based support to the key findings of a number of earlier 
empirical studies on the determinants of Greece’s current account 
position. The trend deterioration in the country’s external imbalance in 
1999-2008 can be traced back to a number of developments, including 
among others:  
 Accumulated loss of economic competitiveness against main trade-
partner economies. Among other reasons, this appears to have been 
the result of faster domestic inflation and unit labor costs (ULCs) 
growth not being fully counterbalanced by respective productivity 
differentials.  
 Pronounced fiscal policy relaxation following the euro adoption. 
Wider fiscal deficits appear to have increased disposable incomes, 
boosting present consumption and reducing private saving. The 
aforementioned effects may have been even more pronounced in the 
initial years following Greece’s euro area entry as domestic 
households probably perceived the initial rise in their disposable 
income as permanent.  
 Domestic financial deepening post the euro adoption. The 
completion of domestic financial sector liberalization in the mid-90s 
and enhanced financial deepening following the euro adoption 
appear to have been additional contributors to the ensuing 
deterioration in the country’s current account position. Note that 
according to AMECO data, domestic MFI credit to domestic 
households and non-MFI businesses has more than doubled since 
Greece’s EMU entry, reaching around 114%-of-GDP at the end of 
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2011, from 51.5%-of-GDP in 2001. As we have explained earlier, 
financial liberalization and financial deepening are often associated 
with lower private saving, thanks to the relaxation of the 
intertemporal budget constraint facing domestic households and 
businesses.  
Regarding the first two of these factors (i.e., economic competitiveness 
and fiscal sustainability), it is important to note that their permanent 
improvement is envisioned in two of the three main strategic pillars of 
the new EU-IMF bailout programme for Greece that was endorsed by 
the February 21,
 
2012 Eurogroup (the third one being the conservation 
of domestic financial stability). Specifically, the new programme 
envisions a further significant decline in the general government deficit 
(and a return to primary surpluses from 2013 onwards) as a result of 
new austerity measures (mainly from the expenditure side) as well as 
the beneficial impact of a market-based restructuring of Greek public 
debt (PSI) and more favorable terms on old and new EA/EFSF loans.    
The new EU-IMF programme for Greece also puts special emphasis on 
structural reforms in the domestic labor and product markets, aiming to 
boost medium-term growth and help reclaim accumulated 
competitiveness losses via a further significant decline in domestic ULCs 
and the   liberalization of key sectors of domestic economic activity. The 
applied package of aggressive fiscal consolidation and structural reforms 
under the first EU-IMF bailout programme (incepted in May 2010) as 
well as deteriorated consumer and investor sentiment propagated a 
sharp contraction in the domestic economic activity, with real output 
having already declined by  as much as 15 percentage points since Q4 
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2008. The new official funding programme is also expected to have an 
initial recessionary impact on the domestic economy. Specifically, new 
EU-IMF baseline scenario forecasts Greek real GDP growth to contract by 
a further 4.8% in 2012, following a near 7% decline in the prior year. 
Domestic economic activity is broadly expected to stabilize in 2013, with 
a return to positive and sustainable growth now expected no earlier 
than in 2014. By implication, the current recession (and more 
competitiveness gains down the road) is expected to further reduce the 
current account deficit in the quarters and years ahead.  
To assess the ability of the new EU-IMF programme to stabilize Greece’s 
current account, we utilize our baseline estimates of the baseline VECM 
Model 1 to produce out-of-sample forecasts for the evolution of 
Greece’s current account position in 2012-2016 under the following two 
scenarios:  
 Scenario A (full adjustment) broadly incorporates the underlying 
macro & fiscal forecasts of the new IMF baseline scenario for Greece 
(IMF County Report No. 12/57, March 2012); and  
 Scenario B (partial adjustment) incorporates a less favorable 
projected trajectory relative to that envisaged in scenario A. 
Specifically Scenario B assumes realized adjustments in our real 
effective exchange rate (rer15) and fiscal balance (ggvnt) variables 
that are half the size the respective adjustment assumed in the first 
scenario.  
Figure 4 shows the forecasted path of Greece’s current account position 
in Scenario A (full adjustment) and Scenario B (partial adjustment) based 
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on the assumed evolution of government deficit, real exchange rate and 
private investment under these scenarios. The derivation of these 
forecasts has been generated by our estimated baseline Model 1, given 
the assumed evolution of the relevant explanatory variables. However, 
due to the obvious uncertainty that is embedded both in model 
specification and the forecasts themselves, we augment our scenario-
based forecasting framework with two additional elements. Specifically, 
we compute fully-dynamic forecasts involving model feedback on the 
explanatory variables of the current account. In other words, the 
forecasts for real exchange rate, government spending and private 
investment are model-generated and not scenario-generated. As a final 
step, we compute average forecasts of our scenario-based and dynamic 
projections.  
Under all these four cases we actually find a projected improvement in 
Greece’s current account position, see Table 5 for a comprehensive 
summary of these forecasts and their standard errors. Specifically, our 
out-of-sample forecasts imply an average current account balance 
(deficit) in 2012-2016 that ranges between -6.64%-of-GDP and -3.96%-
of-GDP i.e., an average improvement of at least 3% ppts-of-GDP and at 
most 6% ppts-of-GDP, relative to the -9.9%-of-GDP current account 
realization in 2011. The margin of error in these projections is on 
average 3% over the entire out-of-sample projection horizon. This, in 
turn, points to an average range of current account projections ranging 
between -1%-of-GDP and -7%-of-GDP under our “full adjustment” 
scenario and between -9.7%-of-GDP and -3.7%-of-GDP under our 
“dynamic adjustment” scenario. 
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Overall, our estimation results and the projections based on our models 
support the necessity of a vigorous implementation of the reforms 
programme agreed with official lenders, so as to enhance fiscal 
sustainability and improve the country’s current account position. The 
latter, in particular, is a prerequisite for stabilizing (and gradually starting 
to reduce) Greece’s external debt, from what currently appear to be 
unsustainable levels. 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
In this paper, we take a close look at Greece’s current account position, 
placing additional emphasis on the main factors that led to its sharp 
deterioration in the post Eurozone entry period. Our study makes three 
main contributions. First, it presents a comprehensive picture about the 
historical evolution of the country’s current account, relating it to the 
existing literature and expanding the findings of previous empirical 
studies. Second, it presents estimation results from several well 
specified models that use most of the underlying determinants 
highlighted in the literature. We find that widened fiscal deficits, 
accumulating competitiveness loses and reduced private saving have 
been among the main drivers of the deterioration in Greece’s current 
account position in the initial EMU years. Other important variables – 
such as openness and terms of trade – also appear to have been having 
an impact, though their direct effect cannot be discerned since they do 
not constitute direct policy variables. Third, we present scenario and 
model-based projections that incorporate the main variables of interest 
and find that they are broadly consistent with a gradual improvement in 
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Greece’s current account, under all different scenarios for their 
evolution examined in this study. However, such an improvement is tied 
to both fiscal consolidation and to a further boost in the country’s 
competitiveness. Such preconditions are in broad agreement with the 
new reforms programme agreed with the EC/ECB/IMF troika of official 
lenders.  
Can Greece be saved? Well, it appears that it can, at least according to 
the theory and if one believes the projections presented in this study. In 
Greece’s case, the onus of proof lies mainly with policy makers and 
social partners. In time we will find out whether the necessary reforms 
to stabilize the country’s external position were truly and correctly 
implemented. 
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Current account determinants and sign of theoretic relationship 
Positive sign (+) indicates positive relationship / negative sign (-) indicates negative relationship 
 
Real Effective Exchange Rate -
GDP per capita  +
GDP growth -
Fiscal balance                                                                         
Ricardian / Keynesian agents (twin deficits)
- / +
Financial integration due to EMU membership                                                                     
Low income/High income country
- / +
Financial deepening (credit to GDP) -
Real interest rate - / +
Age dependency ratio -
Population growth -
Macroeconomic uncertainty  + / -
Trade openness  +
Oil price (oil importing country) -
Freight price (country with large shipping sector)  +
Source: Eurobank EFG Research 





2008 2009 2010 2011                      
est.
Private S-I balance -10.4 2.3 -0.9 -1.9
Investment 20.7 15.4 13.9 12.6
Saving 10.4 17.7 13.0 10.8
Public S-I balance -4.6 -13.5 -9.2 -7.9
Investment 2.9 2.9 2.3 2.1
Saving -1.6 -10.5 -6.9 -5.8
Current account balance -14.9 -11.1 -10.1 -9.8
Gross investment 23.7 18.3 16.2 14.7
Gross domestic saving 8.7 7.2 6.1 4.9
Source: IMF staff calculations (March 2012) 
Greece: Saving-Investment Balance, 2008-11
(in percent of GDP)
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Table 3  
Data and notation 
 
Variable description Country Source Units Notation
Data availability - 
Initial year of 
respective time 
series 
Current account - "Balance on current transactions 
with the rest of the world"  (National accounts)
Greece  AMECO % GDP ca 1960
Real GDP per capita (2005 market prices) Greece AMECO
EUR thousands 
(variable expressed as 
natural logarithm of 
respective value)
ypcgr 1960
Real GDP per capita of Greece relative to real GDP 
per capita of reference country 
Greece vs. 
Netherlands
AMECO % rygrnl 1960
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (-): general 
government - ESA 1995 (Including one-off proceeds 
related to the allocation of mobile phone licences)
Greece AMECO %GDP ggvnt 1980
Real effective exchange rates, based on unit labour 
costs (total economy) :- Performance relative to the 
rest of 23 industrial countries (EU-15, TR, CH, NR, US, 
JP, AU, MX, NZ) : double export weights  (XUNRQ)
Greece AMECO
Index (FY2000=100)     
(variable expressed as 
natural logarithm of 
respective value)
rer23 1970
Real effective exchange rates, based on unit labour 
costs (total economy) :- Performance relative to the 
rest of the former EU-15: double export weights  
(XUNRQ)
Greece AMECO
Index (FY2000=100)     
(variable expressed as 
natural logarithm of 
respective value)
rer15 1960
Old-age dependency ratio (% of working population) Greece AMECO % oadr 1961
Young-age dependency ratio (% of working 
population) 
Greece AMECO % yadr 1961
Total credit to domestic non-MFIs by domestic MFIs 
(outstanding balances e.o.p)
Greece BoG % GDP credit 1980
Terms of Trade (goods & services) Greece AMECO
Index (FY2000=100)     
(variable expressed as 
natural logarithm of 
respective value)
tot 1960
Trade openess Greece AMECO % open 1960
crude oil price Bloomberg
$/br                                       
(variable expressed as 
natural logarithm of 
respective value)
oil 1960
Private Investment (% of GDP) - Gross fixed capital 
formation to GDP ratio private sector 
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Table 4 
Estimation results on the determinants of Greece’s current account balance 
 
ypcgr
-0.01          
(4.56)
0.09            
(0.62)
rygrnl
-0.46               
(5.88)
0.03                
(0.31)
ggvnt 
0.96                                
(4.67)
1.26                
(7.59)
1.31               
(6.27)
0.52                        
(2.67)
-0.24          
(1.58)
-0.38                     
(2.29)
-0.40               
(2.42)
-0.10           
(0.69)
-0.28                
(1.69)
rer23
-0.43                         
(7.08)
rer15
-0.52                              
(8.08)
-0.42               
(6.21)
-0.48             
(7.30)





-0.13                    
(4.82)
-0.19                    
(5.56)
-0.19             
(5.50)
-0.12            
(4.90)
-0.18             
(2.23)
tot
0.26              
(1.85)
0.07                     
(0.63)
0.09                   
(0.84)
open 
-0.22         
(1.61)
-0.15         
(1.81)
pinv
-0.78                               
(3.96)
-0.36                       
(1.90)
-0.13          
(1.07)
-0.16          
(1.01)
-0.09            
(0.47)
eurodummy (d99)
-0.03                          
(3.34)
-0.07           
(3.42)
-0.03          
(2.25)
-0.03                      
(4.01)
-0.03               
(5.00)
-0.04             
(4.11)
-0.03                
(3.02)
-0.03             
(3.30)
-0.04         
(4.16)
-0.03            
(3.63)
crisisdummy(d2008)
0.04            
(2.93)
0.06         
(3.35)
0.06         
(3.42)
0.04                      
(2.91)
0.03          
(3.07)
0.04           
(3.58)
0.06                       
(5.67)
0.06                 
(6.11)
0.04         
(4.42)
0.04             
(3.26)
Number of lags in VECM 2 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1
Adjustment coefficient
-0.44              
(2.62)
-0.55                 
(2.96)
-0.11             
(0.78)
-0.54                                
(3.52)
-0.55        
(4.74)
-0.79                  
(5.16)
-0.87                   
(5.96)
-0.83                
(6.20)
-0.90     
(5.25)
-0.81       
(5.67)
Adj. R-squared 46% 64% 37% 55% 58% 60% 66% 67% 62% 63%
Test on long-run 
restrictions
0.64 0.82 n.a. 0.62 0.58 0.85 0.96 n.a. 0.97 0.69
Trace test 1 2 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
Max test 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
No residual 
autocorrelation
0.44 0.19 0.63 0.34 0.58 0.07 0.03 0.26 0.02 0.10
No residual 
heteroscedasticity
0.54 0.39 0.81 0.38 0.33 0.88 0.64 0.67 0.33 0.11
Residual normality 0.48 0.94 0.24 0.36 0.06 0.16 0.01 0.01 0.84 0.67
Stability of cointegration 0.99 0.74 0.86 0.95 0.30 0.16 0.92 0.96 0.32 0.64
Joint causality of 
explanatory variables on 
curent account 
0.02 0.00 0.1 0.01 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.02
Model 10
Source: Eurobank EFG Research and authors' estimation.
Model 5 Model 6
Variable name  
Model 7 Model 9Model 8
Model 1  
Baseline 
Model 4Model 2 Model 3
Notes:
1. t -statistics in parentheses below point estimates; significance increased when restrictions are valid (unrestricted estimates shown).
2. Test on long-run restrictions indicates the p-value on the null hypothesis of linear combinations of coefficients (where applicable); a value greater than 5% 
implies that the hypothesis cannot be rejected.
3. Trace test and Max test indicate the number of cointegrating relationships present, based on the trace test and maximum eigenvalue test respectively.
4. Residual autocorrelation, residual heteroscedasticity and residual normality indicate the p-value of the respective null hypotheses; a value greater than 5% 
implies that the hypothesis cannot be rejected.
5. Stability of cointegration indicates whether the cointegrating relationship is valid through the whole sample; a value greater than 5% indicates rejection of 
stability.
6. Joint causality indicates whether the dynamic terms of the explanatory variables affect the evolution of the current account; a value greater than 5% 
indicates non-causality.  
 




Projected current account path (%-of-GDP) under different adjustment scenarios 
 
YEAR














2012 -8.15% 1.63% -8.75% 1.63% -9.51% 1.62% -8.80% 1.63%
2013 -6.40% 2.07% -7.60% 2.07% -9.12% 2.55% -7.71% 2.23%
2014 -4.82% 2.31% -5.82% 2.31% -6.60% 3.12% -5.75% 2.58%
2015 -0.97% 2.36% -3.10% 2.36% -4.43% 3.57% -2.83% 2.76%
2016 2.28% 2.36% -0.96% 2.36% -3.12% 3.83% -0.60% 2.85%
Average -3.96% 2.15% -5.47% 2.15% -6.64% 2.94% -5.36% 2.41%
Source: Eurobank EFG Reasearch  
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Figure 3 
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